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Moving Pictures
Carl Plantinga explores how new approaches to cognition are changing how we understand film
At the end of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982), the Replicant Roy Batty (Rutger Hauer) decides
to save his enemy Deckard (Harrison Ford), rather than allow him to fall to his death. As Deckard
lies injured in the rain, he sees the formidable Batty deliver his dying soliloquy, where Batty grieves
the fact that all of his memories will be lost, ‘like tears in rain’. The camera rests on Batty’s
sorrowful face in close-up. ‘Time to die’, he says, and then expires. What is going on in our
response to this scene?
For more than one hundred years, scholars have been attempting to make sense of the human
experience of movies; Hugo Munsterberg’s The Photoplay: A Psychological Study was ﬁrst
published in 1916. Munsterberg, along with William James, Henry Bergson, and, more recently,
Oliver Sacks have all remarked on the similarity of ﬁlms to human streams of consciousness.
Movies are carefully constructed to provide an evolving series of represented events, conveyed to
audiences through complex streams of images and sounds. As ﬁlm theorist V. F. Perkins put it,
movies are like ‘mind recorders’: they mimic human consciousness.
Since the 1980s, the central approach to understanding movies psychologically has been cognitive
ﬁlm and media theory, practiced by both ﬁlm scholars and philosophers interested in aesthetics.
The cognitivists have formed a lively scholarly organization (The Society for Cognitive Studies ofthe Moving Image) with an associated annual conference and professional journal (Projections:The Journal for Movies and Mind).
Early cognitive theory modelled thought on computer-like information processing. This kind of
cognitive approach is not without its detractors, however. Recent times have witnessed an
increased attention to emotion and to the body. Film and media theorists have turned to the
senses, the body, and body metaphors, moods, features of brains such as mirror neurons, and
neurological activity as measured by fMRIs. This turn may be interpreted as threatening to eclipse
an interest in (what is taken to be) cognition.
To understand what’s at stake here, consider the Blade Runner example above. Early cognitive
approaches would have pointed to the ‘computational’ aspects of audience response, such as
inference-making and the testing of hypotheses about the narrative. Yet as I have argued
elsewhere, this ‘scene of empathy’ is designed to elicit strong empathetic reactions and powerful
emotions. How can we make sense of the experience of this scene while taking both mental
‘computation’ and emotion into account?
At the heart of these debates, in my opinion, is a fundamental misunderstanding of just what
cognition is. We experience movies with our bodies, as we sway with the action, erupt in laughter,
or feel that knot of suspense in our stomach. These sorts of observations about the bodily nature
of our experience sometimes lead theorists to conclude that certain theories or accounts of ﬁlms
are ‘too cognitive’. How can the word ‘cognition’, with its suggestion of logic-like information
processing, account for moods, emotions, and bodily experiences such as ﬂinching, swaying, and
weeping? Furthermore, ‘cognition’ seems to imply conscious, self-directed mental activity, rather
than the automatic and involuntary processing that dominates our bodily responses to the world
and to movies in particular.
Once we understand what cognition is and how it is studied, however, these objections fail to
apply. Cognition, simply put, is the mental activities of gaining knowledge and understanding
through thought, experience, and the senses, plus the results of such activities—comprehension,
intuition, insight, perception, and so on. Cognition is neither singular nor linear, with multiple
cognitive processes occurring simultaneously and connected in complex ways. Neither is cognition
necessarily either conscious or rational. Psychologists write of the ‘cognitive unconscious’ to
differentiate it from the Freudian unconscious. Much of cognition occurs beneath consciousness,
and is seemingly automatic rather than voluntary. Moreover, cognition is neutral with respect to
practical rationality, just as emotion is; in themselves, cognition and emotion are neither rational
nor irrational.
The word ‘cognition’ has two different senses that ought to be differentiated at this point.
Sometimes ‘cognition’ is used to designate rational and deliberative mental processes, such as
inference-making, hypothesis-testing, and more generally, thinking. As such, cognition can in
principle be separated from affects such as moods and emotions; it can be conceived of as a ‘cool’
phenomenon. Increasingly, however, we are coming to understand that cognition itself is affected
by emotions and moods, for example, and has a ﬁrm grounding in bodily experience. With this in
mind, cognition ‘proper’ is ‘hot’. Making sense of the world around us, we employ body metaphors,
we gauge physiological feedback, and we are inﬂuenced by emotion.
The viewer’s understanding of characters, narrative events and progression, and narrational point
of view is fundamentally cognitive in nature. What we should say now is not that cognition is
separate from affect, the unconscious, and bodily and automatic processes; rather, a full account
of cognition encompasses them. Cognition itself is infused with emotion, embodied, and in part
automatic. To see how this is true, consider a central means by which viewers experience movies:
sympathy and/or empathy with ﬁctional characters. One of the strongest forces in generating
spectator affective responses is through the characters in a story. If one aspect of our everyday
consciousness is an awareness of the people around us, the movies have the capacity to focus
and strengthen this kind of attention to others by offering virtual relationships with ﬁctional
characters that we can see and hear, as in the Blade Runner example. The kind of spectator–
character relation that theorists have been most interested in is sometimes called ‘identiﬁcation’,
and typically involves some combination of sympathy (feeling for) and empathy (feeling with) the
character.
Sympathy and empathy for characters can be driven by pre-conscious, largely automatic
psychological processes. The use of extended close-ups, facial expressions, and various mood-
inducing stylistic choices (in the Blade Runner scene, darkness, rain, low-key lighting, and
plaintive music, for example) may all have their effect. The use of extended close-ups in such
‘scenes of empathy’ may elicit facial feedback and emotional contagion, thus transferring some of
Roy Batty’s supposed sadness to the spectator. The mood of the scene is somber, and the
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spectator may ‘catch’ some of that somber quality merely by viewing the scene. The mysterious
workings of the brain and its mirror neurons may lead to various mirror effects that partially escape
conscious control. The scene has a ‘feel’, with textural and tonal qualities that strongly affect the
audience. Much recent phenomenological ﬁlm theory attempts to make sense of the spectator’s
sensuous, tactile experience of the movies.
This attention to the body and to the sensuous ﬁlm experience is absolutely vital. Still, cognition is
also vitally important. As soon as the spectator relates this scene to other scenes, differentiates
one character from another, evaluates a character’s behaviour in relation to narrative context, or in
any other way makes sense of the scene in context, cognition becomes the means by which these
impressions, feelings, and responses are united into an experience of the ﬁlm as a whole.
Cognition is ‘hot’, but it is still cognition. Consider The Silence of the Lambs (1991), in which the
villainous Hanibal Lecter matches wits with FBI ingénue Clarice Starling (Jody Foster). During key
scenes of the ﬁlm, Lecter and Starling are ﬁlmed in shot/reverse shot scenes, alternating between
close-ups of their two faces. These extended close-ups may initiate various sorts of automatic
mirror effects in spectators, such as primitive forms of empathy. Yet the spectator’s more complex
responses to these very different characters are governed by cognition, including the spectators’
prior knowledge of the characters and their role in the narrative, evaluation of their motives and
behaviour, and various emotional responses and reactions. Hanibal Lecter may fascinate us, but
most will have stronger sympathy and empathy for Clarice Starling.
The second observation is this: Even if we were to consider the Blade Runner scene apart from its
narrative context (which we typically do not do), cognition would be called into play. In part, this
has to do with cognitive frames or schemas that spectators appeal to, such as character
stereotypes, visual conventions and associations, and even the basic knowledge of the ‘institutions
of ﬁction’—in this case Hollywood’s—and of genre conventions. Beyond this, however, even basic
affects such as moods have cognitive implications, such that the somber mood of the scene can
actually inﬂuence thought. For example, the mood of the initial scenes in which Clarice speaks
with Hanibal is always carefully calibrated. The cellblock resembles a medieval dungeon, with
rough rock walls. The music is suspenseful, the lighting low-key, the ambient sound full of
intimations of unseen horrors that echo in the cave-like setting. Moods have strong associations,
and simply having or eliciting a mood can suggest these associations. The mood of these scenes
from The Silence of the Lambs suggests danger, insanity, violence, and unspeakable horror,
leading the viewer to anticipate and fear these sorts of narrative events. Affects, including both
moods and emotions, are not incidental to cognition, but are an inseparable aspect of how we
come to understand the world around us, including movies.
It is this broader sense of cognition—‘hot’ cognition—that characterizes our experience of movies.
Cognition, properly conceived, includes emotions and body responses as well as ‘computational’
activities. Cognition is at the heart of human experience and at the heart of movie viewing. We
should not minimize the centrality of cognition, but we do need to consistently monitor evolving
ideas about just what cognition is. Both in and outside the movie theater, cognition must account
for the body and emotion.
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